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Complexity in the economy
I wished a simple life for me.
The web I see is too complex to be.
I wish that I might un-
wind this web I've made.
The knot is twisted and hard.
To cut it would destroy
the whole and make discord.
This cannot be.
Spinning tighter and tighter until it breaks.
This life I have begun to
Make.
Alberta Bontemps
Our society is becoming more complex, not just our personal lives. These two
developments stem from many of the same causes, and reversing such trends
does not seem feasible in either sphere. Indeed, with solemn mien politicians,
preachers, futurists, and fanatics have told us so often that the world, in gen-
eral, is becoming more complex that the idea seems commonplace.
Nevertheless, in particular situations the meaning of this idea is often obscure:
What do such pronouncements concretely mean, for instance, regarding the
economy? Under what specific circumstances is the assertion true? Most
importantly, how does it affect our daily lives?
I have written this book because I believe that the concept of complexity is
crucial for understanding the evolution of the U.S. economic system. Defined
precisely and used as a tool of quantitative research, it leads us to ask new
questions about the economy, as well as to give us new answers to many old
questions. It allows us to see how the population is becoming more heteroge-
neous, an important factor underlying the decline of social cohesiveness in the
United States. It provides perspective about the long-term rising unemploy-
ment rate in the economy. It leads us to explore more carefully than before
whether volatility in the economy is increasing. It suggests to us some impor-
tant clues for understanding the changing business strategies by large corpo-
rations. It forces us to look, in a quite different manner, at the changing inter-
national competitiveness of particular American industries. It shows us more
clearly how the government sector has both responded to, and created, the
1
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2 Economic evolution and structure
increasing complexity of the economic system. It guides us to greater under-
standing about a number of processes underlying economic growth. It permits
us to see more clearly the direction in which the institutions of the economy
have been changing and to make predictions about the future evolution of the
economy in a more disciplined manner. Complexity, let me emphasize, is not
a theory but a perspective; it is not an ideology, but an approach to help us see
how a number of seemingly different changes in the economy are related.1
In analyzing the structural complexity of the economic system, three quite
different phenomena must be considered: the structure itself, the processes
generating the complexity of this structure, and the impact of this complexity
on the operation of the system. The first question is primarily descriptive and
requires the development of a set of quantitative indicators. The second ques-
tion is both descriptive and analytic. The descriptive task involves following
the indicators of structural complexity over time; the analytic task involves
exploration of those mechanisms that have created the changing complexity.
The third question involves linking particular aspects of the behavior of the
economic system to its structural components. In some cases, this can be car-
ried out in a rigorously deductive fashion; in other cases, more intuitive meth-
ods of inference must be employed. In both cases, however, I do not rest with
the theory but attempt to test the propositions empirically. It is this link
between theory and behavior that, in turn, allows us to say something about
the future of the economic system in an organized fashion. It is this link upon
which I focus in this book; the policy prescriptions must be left for others.
The first task of this chapter is to explore the meaning of the term complex-
ity, especially since it is used in a number of different ways in the social sci-
ence literature. This is followed by a discussion of some of the major results
in the rest of the book that show how an increase in complexity of the eco-
nomic system influences the behavior of the economy. The final two sections
of the chapter explore how complexity can be measured and the motives that
guide my approach. In order to maintain continuity in both this chapter and the
rest of the book, I present detailed evidence on a variety of particular points in
a series of appendices. Although annoying for those wishing to pursue all
aspects of the argument in depth, this procedure lessens the burden on those
who are willing give the author the benefit of doubt at particular points of the
1. Complexity of the economy is the central focus of a book by Warsh (1984) and, under other
rubrics, of a number of articles by others. While sharing a common vision about the importance
of complexity in understanding the operations of economic systems, these authors have applied
the concept in much different ways than I. Of course, predictions about increasing complexity
are common to all these studies. Nevertheless, it is what the analyst does with the concept for
developing understanding of the operation of the economy that is crucial. Much closer to the
approach taken in this book is an analysis of the structural complexity of exchange systems in
tribal and peasant societies by Stodder (1995).
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Complexity in the economy 3
argument. Above all, this book is not aimed at the specialist in particular
fields, but rather to those who wish to see how the specialized knowledge in
one branch of economics is related to that in another branch.
The meaning of structural complexity
As I will discuss in greater detail in Appendix Note 1.1, the concept of com-
plexity has several different but related meanings. In this study I use the term
only in the sense of structural complexity, which relates to the organization
of a system at a single point in time. Structural complexity is, of course, a
concept that can be employed to describe many different phenomena and we
have only to look around us to find examples. In the field of technology, for
instance, the original turbojet engine of the 1930s had a few parts, of which
only one moved; by 1990 jet engines had a much superior performance but,
at the same time, had almost 20,000 parts.2 In the field of business organiza-
tion, the division of labor has increased so that the number of interactions
within a firm have greatly increased. Or, as I show in Chapter 2, the popula-
tion has become increasingly heterogeneous and this, in turn, increases diffi-
culties of governance.
Problems arise in trying to understand the concept of structural complexity
because particular investigators have employed different definitions tailored to
their own analytical tasks. In some cases the definition is highly abstract, for
instance, Herbert Simon characterizes a complex system in terms of a large
number of parts interacting in a nonsimple way.3 For our investigation of the
evolution of the economic system, it is difficult to employ this definition
empirically. Others have defined complexity in a very narrow fashion, for
instance, in terms of the number of distinct units within a system. This does
not easily serve our purposes either.
Our analytic problems are compounded because the various phenomena
we are studying can be examined from different perspectives so that the con-
cept of complexity can be applied in different ways and can yield seeming-
ly contradictory results. That is, according to one perspective, complexity
might be increasing; but according to another perspective, it may be decreas-
ing. Such difficulties are not confined to economics. For instance, the biol-
ogist George C. Williams points out that in some respects, such as with brain
2. Arthur (1993).
3. Simon (1969), p. 86. In other sciences these conceptual problems also appear. For instance,
Murray Gell-Mann (1994), a Nobel laureate in physics, derives a highly abstract definition of
structural complexity that is useful for his purposes but is difficult to apply to many problems
in the physical sciences. Gell-Mann's approach toward complexity is sufficiently different
from that of Ilya Prigogine, a Nobel laureate in chemistry, that he does not even mention the
latter in his survey of complexity.
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4 Economic evolution and structure
structure, a mammal is structurally more complex than any fish.4 But in
other respects, such as the integumentary histology of the species, the aver-
age fish is much more complex than any mammal. Both perspectives are
useful, even if the conclusions appear at odds. The definition of complexity,
as Nobel laureate Murray Gell-Mann is wise to remind us, is necessarily
context dependent.
The definition of structural complexity used throughout this book starts
with the notion that complexity relates either directly or indirectly to the infor-
mation necessary for those in the system to function effectively. Three differ-
ent but related sets of indicators capture this notion: the direct information
requirements, the elaborateness of the internal configuration of the system and
the accompanying interactions, and the heterogeneity of the elements of the
system. Each of these three indicators captures at least one facet of the concept
of complexity used in ordinary discourse.
Direct information requirements
Any system requiring more immediate information for a person to function
effectively is more complex. In the economic system as a whole, this greater
demand for information is due, in part, to the rising level of technology; and it
is reflected in the greater specialization of labor and a higher per capita
income. The latter, in turn, is accompanied by greater information require-
ments on the consumer side that reflect the greater number of products and
product attributes: We not only have a number of different types of VCRs on
the market from which to choose, but each has a wide number of different fea-
tures. Advanced technology has also lowered costs of communication and
transportation, a major factor in the expansion of the size of individual mar-
kets. All of these aspects of the increasing informational requirements of the
system have influenced not only how institutions are structured, but the strate-
gies they pursue to survive.
Unfortunately, measurement problems to capture aspects of this type of
complexity are severe. Although information requirements or knowledge per
se are difficult to measure from the output side, they have often been investi-
gated by measuring the inputs - especially the labor force - used in gathering,
analyzing, and disseminating information. The latter approach is obviously
imperfect. Measurements of the size of markets and the degree to which addi-
tional information must be taken into account are also difficult. If market
prices are the only information producers consider in their decisions, the size
of markets would make no difference. But if producers base their decisions on
richer information than price, then an increase in exports and imports places a
greater information burden on them.
4. Williams (1966), p. 43. The next reference is to Gell-Mann (1994), p. 33.
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X = for organizations, an order sent from a department listed in a row to a department listed in a
column; for an economy, a flow of products sent from an industry listed in the column rows to
an industry listed in the heads for further processing.
The meaning of these diagrams is discussed in the text. The structural complexity of situation 1
is less than structural complexity of situation 2 that, in turn, is less than the structural complexi-
ty of situation 3. Situation 2 represents an arrangement of the rows and columns such that the
Xs are "triangulated" completely.
Figure 1.1 Intrafirm or intraeconomy interactions.
More elaborate interactions or internal configuration
As the internal organizations of economic units within the economy increase
in specialization and interdependence, more elaborate internal interactions
occur. In certain cases an increase in scale also gives rise to more internal inter-
actions. A simple but unrealistic case arises when an organization requires every
individual to be in contact with every other individual. In this situation, when the
number of employees increases one unit from n - 1 to n, the number of interre-
lations between employees rises by n — 1 units. More realistically, a larger orga-
nization often has more hierarchical levels and, to the extent that this signifies a
greater volume of interrelations between all levels, structural complexity
increases. If, however, department B within the organization deals only with
department A above it and with department C below it, then in a meaningful
sense the complexity faced by the members is only slightly greater than if the
department were self-contained and dealt exclusively with a market. If, howev-
er, a department B must also deal with departments C and D below it and also
with department A above it, and if A, C, and D must also deal with each other,
then complexity has increased considerably in this particular structural sense.
This idea can be easily graphed by creating a matrix with every industry or
department on both the vertical and horizontal axes. In the first example, the
letters stand for departments within an organization, the rows indicate the
department giving orders, and the columns indicate the department receiving
them. An X is placed in the matrix if department A sends orders to department
B. Within a department orders are both sent to and received by department
members, so there is always an X in the diagonal element. This matrix, shown
in Figure 1.1, can have different configurations. In Situation 1, the matrix is
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6 Economic evolution and structure
completely decomposable and each department is self-contained. In Situation
2, the matrix can be triangulated; that is, department A sends orders to all other
departments, department B to all departments but A, and so forth. In Situation
3 the matrix is totally undecomposable. If complexity is defined in terms of
internal interactions, then the increasing structural complexity in moving from
Situation 1 to Situation 3 should be readily apparent.
Such an approach can also be used to examine one aspect of the complexi-
ty of the economy as a whole. In such a case, instead of considering the axes
to be different departments, we define them as different industries, with the Xs
indicating one industry sending products to another for use as inputs in further
processing. The final use of these products (consumption, investment, govern-
ment purchases, and exports) and the factor inputs (labor, land, and capital)
and imports are not included. If they were, we would have an input-output
table; such tables are available for many countries and over a considerable
period of time. As I'll show in the following section, some simple measure-
ments can be developed from such a matrix that allow us to generalize about
the changing complexity of the interindustry flows of the U.S. economy.
Greater differentiation or heterogeneity of units
As the particular units of the economy become more differentiated, diverse,
or heterogeneous, more information is required to understand the system.
Inequality of income for example, is one type of diversity. For policy makers,
a system with quite similar units is much easier to deal with than a system with
quite different units. In the former case, one policy might be suitable for all
units; in the latter case, different policies may be required to deal with dissim-
ilar units. For instance, it requires less information for a government to make
policy where the incomes of the population are roughly equal than if there is
great inequality.
A summary of these three meanings of structural complexity and various
examples to illustrate them are presented in Table 1.1.1 discuss each example
in detail in later chapters. Let me repeat that all three aspects of structural com-
plexity - increasing direct information requirements of the system, increasing
interactions within the system, and increasing heterogeneity of the units with-
in the system - reflect the increasing information requirements necessary for
us to function effectively in the system and, on a personal level, deal with the
increasing complications of life.
Impacts of structural complexity
In the final chapter of this book I will examine various scenarios for the devel-
opment of capitalism in the United States in the light of the four most impor-
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Complexity in the economy 7
Table 1.1. Meaning and examples of increasing structural complexity
Increasing direct information requirements of the system:
• Skill levels (and information processing) of the labor force rises (Chapter 3)
• Share of labor force engaged in creation, processing, and interpreting information
increases (Chapter 3)
• Sizes of markets and variety of products increases (Chapters 6, 8)
• Businesses take into account more governmental regulations (Chapter 9)
Increasing interactions within the system:
• Interrelations between various sectors of the economy become more extensive (Chapter 1)
• Larger share of individual wealth is created directly by the government or through gov-
ernment institutions (Chapter 5)
• Financial interrelations become more intricate as ratio of financial to tangible assets rises
(Chapter 5)
Increasing heterogeneity of the economic system:
• Ethnic differences within the population become more important (Chapter 2)
• Differences in income and wealth become greater (Chapter 2)
• Differences in the size distribution of firms become greater (Chapter 6)
tant - and interrelated - trends that I believe are driving change in the society.
Two of these trends are economic - increasing structural complexity of the
economic system and increasing internationalization of the economy; and two
are social-cultural - a decreasing social cohesiveness and an enervation in the
capitalist spirit. The exact impact of structural complexity on the operation of
the economy is controversial and is a major concern of this study.
In recent years some have used the complexity approach as a telescope to
examine entire economic systems at a single glance. In such analyses it is
often an article of faith that greater complexity leads either to a greater chance
of a malfunctioning of the system or a greater volatility of behavior. An anal-
ogy is often drawn with the frequency of breakdown of complex machinery.
More careful scholars generally confine their generalizations to a relatively
narrow range of phenomena and phrase their proposition more cautiously.5 In
some cases this argument is also tied to decelerating growth because coordi-
nation costs to avoid such breakdowns are rising faster than other costs. For
instance, G. J. Mulgan tells us that "... as institutions, economies, and soci-
For instance, Gell-Mann (1994), p. 28, notes that complex ecosystems are apparently less
resilient to changes in the external environment than comparatively simple ones, but that this is
still a matter of controversy among specialists. If the general linkage between increasing struc-
tural complexity and volatility or lack of resiliency is true, then under certain conditions limits
are placed on the general increase of complexity. The next reference is to Mulgan (1991), p. 2.
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8 Economic evolution and structure
eties grow and become more complex, the costs of coordination and control
tend to rise faster than their material capacities."
This type of systemic approach toward complexity can be easily abused and
from such global propositions about the relation between structural complex-
ity and greater fragility of the system as a whole, we can "prove" the proposi-
tion by selecting a few vivid examples. For instance, in July 1993 an obscure
plant of the Sumitomo Chemical Company in Nihama, Japan, blew up and
destroyed 65 percent of the world's capacity for producing an epoxy resin,
cresol novalac, used to seal most computer chips into their plastic packages.
Shortly thereafter spot prices for computer memory soared. Other "choke-
points" can be specified in the manufacture of computer chips or of equipment
making the chips as well.6 Orio Giarini approaches the global proposition
about increased fragility in a different manner by arguing that since both insur-
ance costs and accident prevention costs have grown much faster than pro-
duction, this must reflect increases in the vulnerability of the system to break-
downs. Unfortunately such evidence is insufficient to prove this proposition.
Those interested in general systems theory have also used the concept of
complexity to speculate about the general deceleration of growth in industri-
alized nations in the last few decades. According to this argument, increased
complexity of an economy requires more resources devoted to information
gathering, processing, and analysis; which means that fewer resources can be
devoted to investment. For example, a measure of the information required for
a market system to function might be the production of those sectors such as
wholesale and retail trade plus finance and real estate, where the primary func-
tion is to serve as an intermediary between buyers and sellers. In the period
between 1950 and 1990, the share of the GDP originating from these sectors
rose from 25 to 39 percent (1982 prices).7
Although this kind of telescopic approach toward complexity is interesting,
it is usually much too grandiose. For instance, the linkage between resources
devoted and investment and to the information sector is far from clear. As
shown in Chapter 4, measurement of the information sector is considerably
more complicated than the use of such simple data might suggest; and more
careful measures yield much less dramatic results. Nevertheless, the telescop-
ic approach does yield useful results if we are more careful with both the the-
ory and the evidence than is usually the case. For example, a fruitful study by
Abhijet V. Banerjee and Michael Spagal uses an interesting mathematical
model to argue that the increasing structural complexity, measured by a trian-
6. The Wall Street Journal, August 27, 1993, p. 1. The citation in the next sentence comes from
Giarini (1985).
7. The data come from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1986), pp.
254-5; and Survey of Current Business, 73, No. 5 (May 1993), p. 54. The series are spliced
using 1977 as the pivot.
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gularized input-output table (see Figure 1.1) accompanying an increase of per
capita income, makes central planning increasingly difficult and the economy
more prone to supply breakdowns. This leads to the proposition that the cen-
trally planned economies manifested a greater deceleration of growth than
market economies, a prediction supported by empirical evidence.8
In studying changes in structural complexity, the microscope is often a more
useful instrument than the telescope and this is an approach adhered to in much
of the following discussion. I start with relatively concrete problems, draw
upon empirical studies of my own and of others, and attack the complexity
problem from the ground up. In some cases where an acceptable theory is lack-
ing, I adopt an inductive approach. For instance, in my study of economic
volatility, I compute indicators of the actual volatility of a large number of
financial and production indicators over a forty-year period to see what has
actually happened. Only then do my speculations about the future begin.
Although definite answers are not always possible, the attempt to match the
various conjectures and propositions against data advances our understanding
because we can remove a clutter of irrelevant theoretical models from the table.
Chapters 2 through 4 deal with the population and the labor force. As shown
in Chapter 2, the complexity of the population structure, as measured by var-
ious indicators of heterogeneity, has increased over the last forty years. Under
certain conditions, such heterogeneity leads to greater problems of gover-
nance, long-run planning, and higher government expenditures (Chapter 9).9
It appears to be an important factor in the decline of social cohesiveness. Some
aspects of this population heterogeneity also have a direct impact on the deter-
minants of economic growth.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the complexity of the structure of the labor force
also has increased in two senses: the overall level of skill required for the var-
ious jobs is higher and the heterogeneity of the jobs has increased. An impor-
tant consequence is that structural unemployment has become more important
over the years, in major part because of imbalances in the supply and demand
for unskilled workers. A crucial indicator is the ratio of earnings of skilled and
unskilled workers, which has widened in the last decade and a half. In one
respect, however, structural complexity in the labor force has declined. This is
in the area of labor-management relations, where labor unions have declined in
importance. Such a change has a number of implications and I present evidence
that these include a decline in fringe benefits and greater wage inequality.
Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the financial structure and the structure of pro-
duction. The former chapter documents a rising structural complexity defined
in terms of the structure of physical and financial assets. Discussion focuses
8. Banerjee and Spagal (1991). Pryor (1994b) provides the empirical evidence for the proposition.
9. Kirby (1985) argues the proposition about governance; Michael (1968) discusses governmen-
tal expenditures.
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10 Economic evolution and structure
on the empirical evidence that such increasing complexity has led to greater
financial distress, for instance, bank failures and bankruptcies, but not greater
volatility, a result with some important implications for monetary policy.
Chapter 6 documents an increasing structural complexity defined in terms of
the informational burden on productive units, the heterogeneity of productive
establishments and enterprises, and also the separation of ownership and con-
trol. The chapter begins with an analysis of a survey on the various strategies
used by enterprises to deal with the increasing complexity of the economic
environment in which they must operate. I then investigate evidence from a
large number of empirical studies that ownership and control of U.S. corpora-
tions are becoming increasingly separated and that this separation has an
important impact on executive compensation and also on firm profits.
Chapters 7 and 8 deal respectively with the behavior of markets for U.S. and
foreign products. Chapter 7 explores the increase in domestic competition that
has come about by the extension of the market - one indicator of structural
complexity - arising from a greater amount of foreign trade. The chapter
shows how the increase in complexity of domestic markets has acted against
the law of one price so that the expected price convergence in different domes-
tic markets has not occurred. It also documents how volatility of prices of raw
materials has increased, largely because of the increase in the volatility of
exchange rates. Chapter 8 shows how the increase in openness of the U.S.
economy has increased in the past at a rapid rate, and how it probably will not
continue in the future. It also examines the sources of U.S. competitiveness on
the world market and the particular role played by products that are techno-
logically advanced or that require highly skilled workers.
Chapter 9 deals with the government sector. It analyzes the differential
growth of particular governmental expenditures to demonstrate how, in this
respect, the government responds to changes in structural complexity. It also
shows how the government has generated structural complexity in markets
through an extension of its regulatory activities. Finally it documents how ris-
ing structural complexity has increased the difficulty of setting both micro-
and macroeconomic policies. As the economy becomes more differentiated
and heterogeneous, the goals of policy may increase in number because of the
varied demands of the different groups. The greater heterogeneity and com-
peting demands increase information requirements of the system and, in addi-
tion, lengthen decision-making lags of policy. At the same time, the policy
tools available to the government for influencing the course of the economy
may diminish as markets increase in scope and the nation becomes more inte-
grated into the international economy.
Chapter 10 presents in detail the argument that increasing structural com-
plexity is one of four major interrelated trends that are shaping the evolution
of the society along with increasing internationalization of the economy,
decreasing social cohesiveness, and enervation of the capitalist spirit. The
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139174602.001
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Libraries, on 10 Oct 2019 at 16:13:18, subject to the Cambridge Core
Complexity in the economy 11
manner in which these trends interact with each other and are countered by
particular policy actions are analyzed with the aid of a scenario analysis that
sketches five possible futures of the economic system. The two extremes of
course, are, no change and exhaustion of the system; the other three scenarios
provide more interesting possibilities.
Measurements of structural complexity
Before ending this introduction, two methodological issues deserve brief dis-
cussion. The first is the actual measurement of complexity which, given my
emphasis on confronting theories with data, is a crucial problem. Edward O.
Wilson, a leading biologist, once remarked:10 "It is not difficult to recognize
complexity ... The difficulty comes in how you measure it." Depending upon
the phenomena under investigation, it is possible to use several different mea-
sures of complexity since each of the three different approaches for defining
complexity has several dimensions.
An example of this multidimensionality of structural complexity can be given
for the economy as a whole in terms of the definition focusing on the elaborate-
ness of the internal configuration of the system. One approach to the problem
uses input-output tables for the United States in 1947 and 1977, employing two
simple measurements of structural complexity that come to mind:
• The first is the ratio of the interindustry flows of production to final
use of the products: For any given level of GDP, the greater the
flows of production from one industry to the other, rather than the
end-user, the greater the structural complexity. This measure of com-
plexity shows no essential change in the U.S. economy during the
postwar era.
• Another measure focuses on the degree to which the interindustry
matrix can be triangulated. By systematically moving the rows and
corresponding columns around, we can try to increase the sum of the
interindustry flows above the diagonal and decrease the sum below
(as shown in Figure 1.1, Situation 2). In this case, the measure of
complexity is the ratio of below-diagonal to above-diagonal flows.
For the United States between 1947 and 1977, the ratio slowly
increased from .317 to .325 when highly aggregated input-output
tables are used; this indicates that structural complexity has slowly
increased.11 Since the input-output table of developing nations con-
tain many more zeros than industrialized nations, this type of com-
10. Cited by Lewin (1992), p. 136.
11. I triangulated comparable 23 by 23 transaction matrices of the 1947 and 1977 input-output
matrices of the United States (from Miller and Blair, 1985, Appendix B). A fuller description
of the calculation is presented in Pryor (1994).
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12 Economic evolution and structure
plexity must have increased much faster at lower stages of the indus-
trialization process, a phenomenon receiving some exploration in the
economic literature.12
The two different measurements of complexity of the U.S. production struc-
ture lead to different conclusions, but this should not cause alarm if we bear in
mind that complexity is multidimensional; indeed, still other measures of
structural complexity based on the input-output tables can be devised as well.
In the specific case under consideration, it can be easily shown that the two
particular measurements of structural complexity lead to different behavioral
properties of the system, so that the multidimensional procedure is justified.
Indeed, any satisfactory theory about complexity must explain the behavior
implications of each measure.
In many cases, structural complexity is most usefully measured by indica-
tors adopted for the occasion with a particular theory in mind. For instance, in
the examination of complexity of the organization of labor in a factory, it is
generally believed that higher levels of skill are tied to more complicated
interactions between the parts of the system. In this case we can use the gen-
eral level of skill of the work force as a measure of this type of complexity.
For studying the complexity of the financial system, it is generally believed
that the relative size of financial to real assets is an important indicator of
financial interactions with the system; therefore, appropriate indicators can be
easily devised (see Chapter 5).
Although these ad hoc measures of complexity are useful, we cannot stop at
this point. Given the importance of information flows in the general definition
of structural complexity, we can draw upon some simple ideas from informa-
tion theory to obtain a more general measure of complexity. The Theil statis-
tic turns out to have the properties needed to measure structural complexity
from an information standpoint. For those unfamiliar with this statistic, it is
discussed in greater detail in Appendix Note 1.2.
For our purposes the Theil coefficient (designated H) can be used in many
different ways. It can be employed to measure both heterogeneity and inequal-
ity, although these two aspects of structural complexity are quite different. If
we wish to compare complexity calculations from different types of data sets,
it is often convenient to normalize the coefficients by the highest value that H
can take so that the homogeneous-heterogeneous scale or the inequality-
equality scale run from 0 to 1.1 call this the relative Theil statistic. The Theil
statistic also can be decomposed easily so that the impact of the individual
parts can be examined. This means, for example, that in studying the distribu-
12. Lamet, Richter, and Teufelsbauer (1972) have the most extensive discussion. They, as well as
Yan and Ames (1965), discuss alternative indicators of structural complexity using input-out-
put tables.
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tion of income, we can determine what part of the total inequality is due to
inequality within particular classes defined by race or gender and what part of
the inequality is due to differences in average income between these groups.
Final remarks on methodology
The last methodological issue concerns the approach, in general, and my
motives for selecting and attacking the various problems in the manner that I
have chosen. For the most part the method of analysis of structural complexi-
ty represents a more general application of the paradigm followed by special-
ists in industrial organization relating behavior to market structure, or by biol-
ogists relating anatomical structures to the adaptiveness of the plants or
animals. As such, it requires little justification.
I do not try to make an exhaustive study of the evolution of the economic
system. Instead, I select a series of issues to discuss that provide insight into
important problems of economic institutions and, at the same time, illustrate
different aspects of changing structural complexity in the post-World War II
era. While it would be possible to study changing structural complexity for a
longer period, I prefer to sacrifice temporal depth for a greater breadth of cov-
erage. It also is possible to explore the evolution of behavior at a lower level
(for instance, at the level of the individual firm) but this also must be left for
others.13 The analysis of both structural complexity and evolution can deal
with many different aspects of the economy, but this study focuses primarily
on the institutional structure of the system as a whole. This means, for
instance, that although many problems of developing technology have an
impact on structural complexity and the evolution of the economy in different
ways, I deal primarily with those impinging on the system.
It also might be satisfying to develop an abstract theory about complexity
and the functioning of an economic system, but this is not my aim. Herbert
Simon posed a deep question when he asked,14 "Is there anything nontrivial,
yet quite general, that can be said about complexity?" With regard to com-
plexity in the structural or morphological sense, I suspect that the answer is
"not a great deal" and that Simon himself has well covered the field.
Unfortunately, most purely theoretical discussions about complexity in the
social sphere suffer from tediousness, pomposity, or both. Moreover, the level
of abstraction is sufficiently high that the relation of the resulting theory to
13. One first-rate piece of work along these lines is by Nelson and Winter (1982), but their book
explores the economic evolution at a different level of abstraction and asks quite different
questions than this study, which is more concerned with institutional structure. The same may
be said about studies such as Arthur (1994) or other analyses briefly mentioned in Appendix
Note 1.1 or in an extremely useful study by Nelson (1995).
14. Simon (1977), p. 170.
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real-world phenomena is tenuous at best and nonexistent at worse. Such theo-
rizing, which can be carried out easily in the comfort of one's armchair, has
the advantage of avoiding the hard work necessary for concrete economic
research; but it hardly serves to advance our state of knowledge.
My purpose is much different: to use the various concepts of complexity to
examine in an empirical fashion different aspects of the evolving U.S. eco-
nomic system. Unlike some observers, I do not see the U.S. economic system
evolving in the next few decades into some type of postcapitalist economy that
is qualitatively so different from that to which we are accustomed that all we
need to do is to sketch its major outlines.15 Moreover, unlike many, I do not
believe that societal and historical change is accelerating in the world today.
Rather, I believe that we are evolving slowly and that it is necessary to be as
specific as possible in our discussion of the future, particularly to avoid gen-
eral propositions with dubious empirical relevance. Given the constraints of
space, the disadvantage of my approach is that only a few problems in the var-
ious areas of the economy can be discussed. I hope, however, that the particu-
lar economic problems receiving attention will serve to stimulate others to
employ the approach to analyze problems that they believe are important.
Since I am concerned not just with the past but also with the future of the
economic system, let me add yet another caveat. We must follow Talleyrand's
maxim that above all we must avoid overenthusiasm ("surtout pas trop de
zele"). Therefore, I try to abstain from the uncritical and irresponsible gusto of
many practitioners of futurology, especially the wishful thinking, the confu-
sion of the "will be" and the "ought to be," and the sermonizing. I also try to
adopt work habits quite different from futurologists who, like theorists of com-
plexity, are also addicted to sitting in their armchairs and, on the basis of mis-
cellaneous anecdotes and statistics picked up during the day, letting their
imaginations freely roam. Without feeling it necessary to examine systemati-
cally all the available data, these futurologists can generate all sorts of "inter-
esting" predictions but, as Bertrand Russell once remarked in a different con-
text, this type of scholarly endeavor has all of the advantages of theft over hon-
est toil. Also it is unfortunate that the writings of many who believe they are
blessed with the gift of prophesy are so breathless, pretentious, smug, and
moralistic that the literature is an ordeal to read; I also try to avoid these traps.
An old Chinese proverb tells us that prediction is difficult, especially about
the future. Most forecasts are actually observations about what has happened
in the past and present, and which trends in this period are likely to have an
impact on tomorrow. Thus, our knowledge of the present and the future is
inextricably mixed. Since our comprehension of the present is in continual
15. Carnevale (1993), Drucker (1993), and Toffler (1981) are typical of those believing that we
are evolving into a qualitatively different economic system. Attali (1991), p. 3 is typical of
those asserting that social change is accelerating.
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flux, we can understand one important meaning of Paul Val6ry's oft-cited
aphorism, "The Future is not what it used to be." And we also understand why
a thorough understanding of the present is necessary for prediction.
Despite the pitfalls, the complexity approach has several advantages in
studying the future. It forces the analysis to be sufficiently specific about what
is happening in the present so that meaningful predictions can be made. It also
provides an alternative to most of the current economic studies of the future
that focus on such problems as the future level of the GDP, population, pollu-
tion, raw material stocks, or the forthcoming discoveries and innovations that
allegedly will alter our lives. Instead, it directs our attention to a much differ-
ent set of problems concerning the changes in economic institutions and in
policies that influence their behavior.
To avoid confusion about my aims and methods, let me also explain briefly
what I do not argue in this book:
• I do not believe that complexity of the economy always increases
and, in this case, we can find an analogy in the field of biology.
Although it has been part of the conventional biological wisdom from
Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer to the present that life is becom-
ing more complex, some biologists and geologists have argued
recently that in important dimensions, this is not the case. In a survey
of these issues Daniel V. McShea shows that it is not only difficult to
measure complexity but that decreases in biological complexity are
common.16 This should serve as a warning to social scientists, where
it is part of the conventional wisdom that societies relentlessly and
continuously evolve into more complex forms.
• I also do not argue that complexity is some type of exogenous phe-
nomenon that "just happens." Often the degree of complexity of an
16. Some of the types of evidence in this debate are useful to note. McShea (1991) examines three
different measures of the complexity of the vertebrae of four classes of aquatic animals and
compares the results with similar measures for surrogates of their terrestrial ancestors. He
finds a drift away from complexity, not toward it, in most cases. Boyajian and Lutz (1992)
show an increase in the complexity of ammonoids (an extinct class of swimming, shelled
mollusks), as measured by the lobs and saddles of their internal chambers, for about 200 mil-
lion years; thereafter, this measure of complexity levels off. Bonner (1988) points out that
complexity is often related to size and he makes a case for a generalized version of Cope's
rule (over geological time organisms generally increase in size). But he also points out numer-
ous exceptions to this rule. Moreover, he shows that although a positive relationship between
size of animals and certain measures of complexity such as number of cell types exists, the
relationship is weak. Attempts to link complexity, as measured by the size of the genome or
the coding DNA per genome, to some types of gross measures reflecting the hierarchy of the
species give rise to even more problems (Bonner, 1988, p. 123; Smith, 1988, p. 220). Some
recent studies suggest that the increasing ability for information processing of the brains of
certain mammals, which is yet another sign of increasing structural complexity, appears an
exception, rather than a rule of nature (Lewin, 1992, Chapter 7)
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economy is a function of policies taken by governments or private
individuals that can be reversed. For instance, complexity in the finan-
cial system, as manifested by a high ratio of financial to physical
assets, is in large measure a function of governmental regulation of
financial intermediaries. In some cases, as I argue in detail in Chapter
9, the government creates structural complexity through its regulatory
activities. In still other situations institutions develop that allow com-
plexity to be reduced in certain dimensions, for instance, the market.17
• Moreover, I do not believe that economic or social problems neces-
sarily increase with complexity. For instance, although no ethnic prob-
lems occur when the population is ethnically homogeneous, the most
severe ethnic problems may not be most acute with the maximum het-
erogeneity, but somewhere between the two extremes. More specifi-
cally, such problems may be most acute, not in a situation where the
population is evenly divided among two ethnic groups, but in a situa-
tion where one is 15 percent and the other is 85 percent. In the latter
case, the predominance of one group may give rise to inappropriate
behavior on its part toward the other group (for instance, the activities
of the Hutu in Rwanda) that would never occur either where the eth-
nic groups are 50-50 or where the minority group has only 1 or 2 per-
cent of the population. Similarly, ethnic tensions may be much higher
when there are few ethnic groups than when there are many.18
• I do not use the complexity perspective for normative purposes - to
argue for or against particular governmental policies or to provide
advice on how best an individual can face the future. Rather, this is
From the discussion of Gell-Mann (1994), pp. 227-31 and 244-46, three additional con-
siderations become important to take into account: First, we must not confuse the average
complexity of the entire population with the complexity of a particular species. Second, cer-
tain types of complexity can increase simply as a result of a random genetic walk that have
no correlation with biological fitness. Third, decreases in social complexity are not only pos-
sible but have also occurred often in history, for instance, in Central America after the col-
lapse of the Classic Maya civilization or in Europe after the collapse of the Roman empire.
This kind of statement, however, depends upon a special definition of complexity and in some
respects, for instance, heterogeneity of ruling groups, structural complexity increased.
17. This argument does not necessarily mean that fewer resources for information processing and
dissemination are utilized in market than in centrally planned economies. My own calcula-
tions (Pryor, 1977) have shown that these costs were roughly similar in the two types of
economies, although I believe that more useful information was transmitted through the mar-
ket mechanism.
18. For instance, in Malawi where the major ethnic groups number less than ten, there seems to
be a much greater sense of ethnic identification than in Madagascar, where there are almost
fifty. In an investigation (Pryor, 1990) of both countries I attempted to identify the ethnicity
of some seventy-five cabinet ministers; in Malawi the task was easy and could be accom-
plished with the aid of several informed observers. In Madagascar the task proved extremely
difficult and required many more interviews.
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an exercise in positive economics - to identify past and future trends
and to investigate the performance of particular sectors of the econo-
my. In Chapter 6, for instance, I am more interested in how managers
actually deal with increased structural complexity, rather than how
they should deal with the problem, a question that I leave to well-paid
business advisors to discuss. Although the policy implications of the
findings in this study are important, it would take a separate book to
work them out.
• Finally, I do not argue that increased structural complexity necessar-
ily reflects progress in some general sense.19 In economics the notion
of progress in a general sense is not very useful. Instead, discussion
focuses on the behavior of economic systems according to such con-
crete criteria as economic growth or the distribution of income. If
economies have increased in complexity to adapt to certain circum-
stances, it is not clear that economic performance along many other
dimensions has improved; this is a matter for empirical investigation,
since theory often tells us little about the nature of the tradeoffs.
Having briefly noted what this study is not about, let me conclude by
emphasizing that this study is about empirical questions of positive eco-
nomics: In what ways is structural complexity increasing or decreasing in
the U.S. economic system? If such changes are occurring, how do people
deal with them and what impact do they have on the functioning of the econ-
omy? The concept of structural complexity provides a useful framework to
examine these questions for different sectors and institutions of the econo-
my. Each chapter constitutes a relatively self-contained essay, tied with the
other chapters primarily with regard to approach and the use of the same
conceptual framework.
I am not trying to provide a general theory of how the economy works, but
rather to use the concept of structural complexity to ask questions about the
economy that have not been previously posed and to show how diverse eco-
nomic phenomena in different sectors are related. My aim is to use the concept
to examine changes in institutions throughout the economy in a more system-
atic and fruitful fashion than up to now.
19. Abiological analogy offers insight. In this discipline the notion of progress is suspect and has
given rise to considerable debate (for instance, among the various authors in Nitecki, 1988).
Furthermore, the linkage between progress and complexity is even more problematic. For
instance, Boyajian and Lutz (1992) show that among the ammonoids, no relationship can be
found between extinction rates and complexity. Moreover, if complexity of the brain and its
information processing capacity is measured by mass, it is not clear that porpoises, elephants,
and blue whales, all of which have larger brains than humans, are somehow smarter. In any
case the notion that human intelligence is related to brain size has been long discredited
(Gould, 1981).
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